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Abstract—This paper1 reports the effort of using agent-based 
mix-game model to predict financial time series. It introduces 
simple generic algorithm into the prediction methodology, and 
gives an example of its application to forecasting Shanghai Index. 
The results show that this prediction methodology is effective and 
agent-based mix-game model is a potential good model to predict 
time series of financial markets. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Forecasting financial markets is a continuous effort of 
researchers, and attracts great attention of practitioners. The 
use of agent-based models for forecasting financial markets 
is a new attempt in this area. Neil F. Johnson etc. reported on 
a technique based on multi-agent games which has potential 
use in predicting future movements of financial time-series. 
In their articles, a “third-party” game is trained on a 
“black-box” time-series, and then run into the future to 
extract next step and multi-step predictions [1, 2, 3]. They 
used minority game as the third party game. In order to 
improve the forecasting accurate rate, I use mix-game [13,17] 
as the third party game. I found that using mix-game can 
improve forecasting accurate rate at least 3% more than 
using minority game. I also found the forecasting accurate 
rate is sensitive to the initial strategy distribution (ISD) of 
agents. Therefore, I introduce simple generic algorithm into 
the forecasting process to select the better ISD. This paper 
reports the results of using agent-based mix-game model to 
predict financial time series.   
A.  Mix-game Model 
Challet and Zhang’s MG model, together with the original 
bar model of Arthur, attracts a lot of following studies. 
Given the MG's richness and yet underlying simplicity, the 
MG has also received much attention as a financial market 
model [4]. The MG comprises an odd number of agents 
choosing repeatedly between the options of buying (1) and 
                                                          
1 This research was performed in collaboration with Professor Neil 
F. Johnson, Oxford University. 
selling (0) a quantity of a risky asset. The agents continually 
try to make the minority decision, i.e. buy assets when the 
majority of other agents are selling, and sell when the 
majority of other agents are buying. Neil Johnson [5, 6] and 
coworkers extended MG by allowing a variable number of 
active traders at each timestep--- they called their modified 
game as the Grand Canonical Minority Game (GCMG). The 
GCMG, and to a lesser extent the basic MG itself, can 
reproduce the stylized facts of financial markets, such as 
volatility clustering and fat-tail distributions.  
However, there are some weaknesses in MG and GCMG. 
First, the diversity of agents is limited since agents all have 
the same memory length and time-horizon. Second, in real 
markets, some agents are tendency-followers, i.e. “noise 
traders” [7~12, 18~22], who effectively play a majority 
game; while others are “foundation traders”, who effectively 
play a minority game. 
In order to create an agent-based model which more 
closely mimics a real financial market, C. Gou modifies the 
MG model by dividing agents into two groups: each group 
has different memory and time-horizon, and one group play 
the minority game and the other play the majority game. For 
this reason, this system is referred to as a ‘mix-game’ model 
[13, 17].  
Since mix-game model is an extension of minority game 
(MG), its structure is similar to MG. In mix-game, there are 
two groups of agents; group1 plays the majority game, and 
group2 plays the minority game. N (odd number) is the total 
number of the agents, and N1 is number of agents in group1. 
The system resource is R=N*L, where L<1 is the proportion 
of resource of the system. All agents compete in the system 
for the limited resource R. T1 and T2 are the time horizon 
lengths of the two groups, and m1 and m2 denote the 
memory lengths of the two groups, respectively.   
The global information only available to agents is a 
common bit-string “memory” of the m1 or m2 most recent 
competition outcomes (1 or 0). A strategy consists of a 
response, i.e. 0 (sell) or 1 (buy), to each possible bit string; 
hence there are 
122
m
or 
222
m
 possible strategies for 
group1 or group2, respectively, which form full strategy 
spaces (FSS). At the beginning of the game, each agent is 
assigned s strategies and keeps them unchangeable during 
the game. After each turn, agents assign one (virtual) point 
to a strategy which would have predicted the correct 
outcome. For agents in group1, they reward their strategies 
one point if they are in the majority; for agents in group2, 
they reward their strategies one point if they are in the 
minority. Agents collect the virtual points for their strategies 
over the time horizon T1 or T2, and they use their strategy 
which has the highest virtual point in each turn. If there are 
two strategies which have the highest virtual point, agents 
use coin toss to decide which strategy to be used.  
Excess demand is equal to the number of ones (buy) 
which agents choose minus the number of zeros (sell) which 
agents choose. According to a widely accepted assumption 
that excess demand exerts a force on the price of the asset 
and the change of price is proportion to the excess demand 
in a financial market, the time series of the price can be 
calculated based on the time series of the excess demand [14, 
15, 16].  
Through simulations, C. Gou finds out that the 
fluctuations of local volatilities change greatly by adding 
some agents who play majority game into MG, but the 
stylized features of MG don’t change obviously except 
agents with memory length 1 and 2, and the correlation 
between the average winning of agents and the mean of 
local volatilities of the systems is different with different 
configurations of m1 and m2. She also gives suggestions 
about how to use mix-game model to simulate financial 
markets, and shows the example of modeling Shanghai stock 
market by means of mix-game model [13, 17]. 
B. Prediction Method 
We use mix-game model to do one-step direction 
prediction about a real time series produced by a financial 
market, whose dynamics are well-described by a mix-game 
model for a unknown parameter configuration of T1, T2, m1, 
m2, N, N1 and an unknown specific realization of initial 
strategy distributions (ISD). We call this as the “black-box” 
game. Based on mix-game model, we need to identify 
“third-party” game which can be matched with the 
black-box game. After we select the parameter configuration 
for the third party game, we use it to predict the time series 
produced by the black-box game [1~3]. Fig.1 shows the 
work flow for prediction.  
In the third party game, agents receive the global 
information which is strings of 1's and 0's (WinEx) digitized 
from the real time series produced by the black box game 
other than that (WinIn) generated by the third party game 
itself, and agents also reward their strategies according to 
the real time series (WinEx). In order to see the 
performances of the third party game, we compare the time 
series generated by the third party game with the real time 
series produced by the black box game, i.e. we compare 
WinIn with WinEx because we just predict the direction. If 
they match, the third party game gets one point; if not, it 
gets zero. This point is referred to as accurate scores. At 
each predicting timesteps, we calculate the accurate rate 
which is equal to accurate scores divided by predicting 
timesteps. 
Accurate rate (current time)  
=accurate scores / predicting timesteps      (1) 
 
 Fig.1 work flow for prediction 
 
C. Forecasting Process 
1) Searching for Parameters of Mix-game Model to 
Simulate a Specific Financial Market 
First we need to search for proper parameter 
configurations for modeling the target financial market in 
order to identify the third party game. According to [13, 17], 
the mix-game model with some parameter configurations 
reproduces the stylized features of financial time series. 
Black box game 
Real time 
series
WinEx= 
sign (real time 
series ) 
Third party game 
Time series 
WinIn= 
sign (time series) 
Accurate scores 
Therefore, we need to choose parameters of m1, m2, T1, T2, 
N and N1 when using mix-game to model financial markets. 
To do so, the following aspects need to be considered. 
z First make sure the time series of mix-game can 
reproduce the stylized facts of time series of financial 
markets by choosing proper parameters, especially m1 
and m2 must be larger than 2, and m1< m2; 
z Second pay attention to the fluctuation of local 
volatilities, and ensure that the median of local 
volatilities of mix-game is similar to that of the target 
time series; 
z Third make sure the log-log plot of absolute returns 
look similar. 
  
2) Searching for the Better ISD by Using Simple Generic 
Algorithm 
Second, the ISD need to be chosen in full strategy space 
(FSS) in order to improve accurate rates because the 
accurate rates are greatly sensitive to ISD. However, the FSS 
is huge and can not be searched thoroughly by trial-error 
method. In order to perform the search, I use simple generic 
algorithm (SGA) with different parameter configurations of 
mix-game model for the target financial market. 
Since I use a set of parameters to generate ISD, the 
problem of searching for the better ISD is a problem of 
searching for a set of parameters of ISD. In order to use 
SGA to optimize parameter sets, first I code the parameter 
set into a set of strings of zeros and ones, which are 
“chromosomes”; then I attach fitness to them. In our case, 
the fitness is just the accurate rate. The following is SGA 
where P(t) indicates the population of parameter sets used to 
generate ISD. 
       
SGA( ) 
%{  t=0; 
%   initialize P(t);  
     %   evaluation P(t); 
%} 
% while (not terminal-condition ) 
% {  
%   t=t+1; 
              %    select P(t) from P(t-1); 
              %    recombined P(t);  
              %   evaluation P(t);  
 %} 
At this stage, usually one needs to adjust N1, T1 and T2 
so as to get better ISD. Generally speaking, the parameters 
of N1, T1 and T2 for forecasting are slightly different from 
that for simulating a financial market 
 
II. MAIN RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
As an example, I use this methodology to forecast 
Shanghai Index dating from 02-07-2002 to 30-12-2003 
 
A. Mix-game Model for Shanghai Stock Market 
Since the median value of local volatilities of Shanghai 
Index daily data from 1992/01/02 to 2004/03/19 is 222, two 
parameter configurations of mix-game model have the 
similar median values of local volatilities according to [13]; 
one configuration is m1=3, m2=6, T1=12, T2=60, N=201, 
N1=72, the other is m1=4, m2=6, T1=T2=12, N=201, 
N1=72[13]. 
 
B. Optimal Parameters and Their Forecasting 
Accurate Rates 
TABLE I 
OPTIMAL PARAMETER CONFIGURATIONS AND THEIR 
FORECASTING ACCURATE RATES AT 200 TIMESTEPS AS WELL 
AS ACCURATE RATES OF CORRESPONDING MG (I.E. N1=0) 
N0
Parameter 
configurations of 
mix-game 
Accurate 
rates of 
mix-game 
Accurate 
rates of 
MG 
1 m1=3, m2=6, N=201, N1=90, T1=24, T2=24, 61.3% 
45.7%
2 m1=3, m2=6, N=201, N1=90, T1=12, T2=24, 60.3% 
49.3%
3 m1=3, m2=6, N=201, N1=95, T2=12, T1=12, 61.8% 
51.8%
4 m1=4, m2=6, N=201, N1=95, T1=12,T2=24, 
59.3% 49.3%
5 m1=4, m2=6, N=201, N1=90, T1=24, T2=24, 
61.3% 49.8%
6 m1=4, m2=6, N=201, N1=85, T1=12, T2=24, 
60.8% 48.7%
7 m1=4, m2=6, N=201, N1=80, T1=18, T2=24, 60.8% 
48.7%
 
Table 1 lists the resulting optimal parameter 
configurations and their forecasting accurate rates at 200 
timesteps as well as accurate rates of corresponding MG (i.e. 
N1=0) related to different specific ISD found by SGA 
program. Most accurate rates for mix-game are larger than 
60% while they are at least 10% smaller for MG with the 
same parameters and ISD. This results show that mix-game 
model really can improve the prediction accurate rates. 
 
Fig.2. shows an example of the in sample time series of 
the accurate rates of the parameter configuration of m1=3, 
m2=6, T1=T2=24, N1=90, N=201 with a specific ISD. One 
can find that the accurate rate has high value at short time 
period which is around 30 timesteps and the accurate rate 
reaches a stable level from 120 timesteps to 200 timesteps. 
The time series of the accurate rates of other parameter 
configurations behave similar to Fig.2.   
 
 
Fig.2. In sample time series of the accurate rates of parameter configuration 
of m1=3, m2=6, T1=T2=24, N1=90, N=201 with a specific ISD 
 However, we notice that the landscape of the accurate 
rates vs. the parameter sets of ISD seems rugged. So the 
better accurate rates are just obtained by the present SGA 
program, and there are chances to improve SGA program so 
as to get better accurate rates. 
 
C. Out of Sample Test 
I do out of sample test by shifting the forecasting time 
window which is 200 timesteps. First, I shift the time 
window 100 timesteps (T3=100) forward along the time 
series of Shanghai Index. Second, we shift the time window 
215 timesteps (T3=215) forward along the time series of 
Shanghai Index.  
Fig.3 shows the resulting time series of the accurate rates 
of parameter configuration of m1=3, m2=6, T1=T2=24, 
N1=90, N=201, T3=100 with the same specific ISD as that 
in sample. From Fig.3, we can find that the accurate rate is 
higher than 60% after forecasting timestep is 40. The time 
series of accurate rates of other parameter configurations 
behave similar to Fig.3. 
 
 
Fig.3. out of sample time series of the accurate rates of parameter 
configuration of m1=3, m2=6, T1=T2=24, N1=90, N=201, T3=100 with the 
same specific ISD as that in sample 
 
 
Fig.4 time series of the accurate rates of parameter configuration of m1=3, 
m2=6, T1=T2=24, N1=90, N=20, T3=215 with the same specific ISD as 
that in sample 
 
Fig.4. shows the resulting time series of the accurate 
rates of parameter configuration of m1=3, m2=6, T1=T2=24, 
N1=90, N=201, T3=215 with the same specific ISD as that 
in sample. From Fig.4, we can see that the accurate rate 
drops quickly and only a little above 50% after forecasting 
timestep is 40. The time series of accurate rates of other 
parameter configurations behave similar to Fig.4. 
 
The results of out of sample test suggest that we need to 
tune ISD along the time series which we try to forecast. We 
will report the study on this issue elsewhere [23]. 
 
III. CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion, our prediction methodology is effective 
and agent-based mix-game model is a potential good model 
to predict time series of financial markets. The further study 
will focus on the improvement of SGA program in order to 
find better ISD so as to get better accurate rates. And 
another issue which is worthwhile to study is how the ISD 
changes along the time series which we try to forecast. 
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